

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/06/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300040014-6

COMMENTS RE TS#89059

A step beyond the "deeds not words" line would hardly be warranted at this stage. The "deeds" performed so far by the Soviets in East Germany, or with regard to the Turkish Straits, could at best be considered as moves of a promisory nature. Quite likely they are nothing more than tactical moves similar to so many other concessions to liberalism throughout the history of Communist statehood. Especially our experience with the Soviets since 1945 should be instructive in that the promises as a rule have not been made in good faith. Moreover, the gestures made in East Germany, even if all genuine, would ameliorate only a small fraction of the injustices perpetrated by the Communists. As far as East Germany is concerned, the only deed that would indicate that the Soviet intentions are probably honorable would be the resignation of the Communist government and an election with the various political parties permitted to run independently without any Communist tutelage.

The events in East Germany and Czechoslovakia should definitely be in our favor for regaining the initiative. The riots and any similar local outbursts against Soviet oppression, if exploited with relation to the global anti-Soviet struggle, should constitute our best ground for attack. Timely comments about the rebelling populations attributed to the White House and State Department could prove to be most embarrassing to the Soviets.

Re-capturing the initiative does not necessarily depend upon some novel ideas of approach, but rather on the methods of exploiting the main and basic anti-Communist themes in the light of current events. Instead of defending our policies and activities, we should be in a position to make our accusations loud and serious enough to cause the Communists to revert to a defensive attitude.

The cleavages in the Soviet Bloc since the death of Stalin should be exploited. For instance, the radical changes in the politbureaus, even if the background can in many respects be explained only by assumption, should be developed as indications of uneasiness and lack of security.

Example: The upheaval at the top in the Supreme Soviet for the Ukraine. Melnikov, the Kremlin's most loyal agent, organizer and executioner in Kiev, has been purged. Kirichenko, formerly accused of ideological deviationism, became the head of the Ukrainian CP. Still more significantly, Alexander Korneichuk, a writer, formerly accused of bourgeois nationalism, has been named as Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Ukraine.

Shifting of top personnel like the above is the best indication of a serious friction that must be going on in the Communist hierarchy.

Distribution:

Copy # 1 - ☐ 25X1A

# 2 - PAD Files

# 3 - ☐

# 4 - RI

Deputy Chief

Political Action Division

Approved For Release 2003/06/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300040014-6

**TOP SECRET**

Copy 1 of 4 Copies

25X1A

TS # 89145

TOP SECRET

D-40

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COMMENT SHEET

FOR THE INTRA-OFFICE USE OF OSO & OPC ONLY

AS A COVER ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 38-13

NOTICE

Detaching Form No. 38-13 for the purpose of securing this form to Top Secret Documents is Prohibited.

**ATTENTION:** ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATERIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN COLUMNS PROVIDED. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO SEES THIS TOP SECRET DOCUMENT WILL ENTER DATE OF HANDLING AND SIGN HIS FULL NAME IN THE PROPER COLUMNS. OFFICER DESIGNATIONS SHOULD BE USED IN THE "TO" COLUMN. UNDER EACH COMMENT A LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN ACROSS SHEET AND EACH COMMENT NUMBERED TO CORRESPOND WITH THE NUMBER IN THE "TO" COLUMN. EACH OFFICER SHOULD SIGN FULL NAME BEFORE FURTHER ROUTING.

FROM:

DCIPAD

CONTROL NO.

89145

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S FULL NAME	COMMENTS
		REC'D.	FWD'D.		
1. TSCo		19 JUN 1953	19 JUN 1953	<div>Copy of 4 Copies</div> <div>file</div>	25X1A
2. 1304	11/4	19 JUN 1953	19 JUN 1953		
3. CPY	5				
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

THIS FORM MUST BE DETACHED PRIOR TO TRANSMITTING TOP SECRET MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF OSO OR OPC.

25X1A